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MOT-kyselyn tulokset

Jorma Ollila
Nokian hallituksen puheenjohtajana toiminut Jorma Ollila saa paljon arvostelua osakseen MOT:n analyytikkokysellyssä Jorma Ollila Kuva: Yle jorma ollila

3.1.1 MOT:n kysely analyytikoille / The MOT survey on Nokia

Tavoitimme 37 analyytikkoa, heistä 21 osallistui kyselyyn / We contacted 37 analysts, 21 took part in the survey. Kysely tehtiin ennen Nokian 11.4. antamaa tulosvaroitusta / The survey was done before Nokia lowered its first quarter outlook on April 11.

1. How would you rate the overall performance of Jorma Ollila as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Nokia Corporation (1999–)?

  • 5. Outstanding: 0%
  • 4. Exceeds Expectations: 15%
  • 3. Competent: 45%
  • 2. Poor: 30%
  • 1. Unacceptable: 10%

Please, elaborate:
* (poor:) While Jorma Ollila effectively engineered the company's incredible turn-around in the '90s with a string of genius strokes (visionary direction choice with mobile technologies; consumerisation of mobile handsets, early and efficient push into emerging markets; refined supply chain and manufacturing practices), the germs of Nokia's demise have been planted by his early choices in Software & Services, where his moves were hesitant, awkward or simply wrong (choice of Psion core software as the basis for Series 60 / smartphone software; Club Nokia). Moreover, there was no questioning of Nokia's traditional market segmentation and clone-model manufacturing with a proliferation of near-identical devices when Nokia first stumbled in 2004 and lost share (that was actually never regained) in mature markets to first Motorola, then Samsung – Ollila himself engineered the short-lived turnaround that lasted between 2005 and 2007, based on "old Nokia" recipes that made Nokia look good for a moment (N95, 6300, E60–61) but unfortunately cemented its demise that happened almost overnight with the emergence of the "modern smartphone".

* (exceeds expectations:) Ollilan johdolla Nokiasta nousi toimialan tehokkain ja vahvin yhtiö. Taloudellinen suoritus oli erinomaista lähes koko 2000-luvun. Yhtiö loi älypuhelinmarkkinan ja johti sitä pitkään. Miinuspisteet tulevat epäonnistumisesta reagoida älypuhelinmarkkinan dynamiikan nopeaan muutokseen, joka alkoi 2007 sekä NSN:n yhteistyrityksen epäonnistumisesta.

* (unacceptable:) Ollila kept a divided management team below him, without strong leadership, to maintain his influence on the company. While charismatic leaders where taking forward competitors Nokia sank under weak consensus building management.

* (poor:) Puheenjohtajakauden alkupuoliskolla Jorma Ollila onnistui tehtävässään erinomaisesti, mutta viime vuosien strategiset virhearviot ovat olleet yhtiölle kohtalokkaita.

* (poor:) Nokia’s fall is a ten-year long process and started well before OPK took over as CEO. The company has been a victim of its success and became arrogant and ignorant owing to continued, strong performance over its traditional rivals.

* (competent:) He performed very well in the early years but towards the end he did not take enough action fast enough with Kallasvuo's problematic CEO tenure. I think the end of Ollila's tenure has also repeated a similar problem with Elop as CEO

* (competent:) This is a very tough question to answer. Under Jorma’s stewardship Nokia had a catastrophic collapse. His chosen successor (OPK) led the company in poor strategic direction. However – the reason for a less negative score is because Jorma’s legacy with Nokia cannot be ignored – it really is one of the big success stories in global business.

* (unacceptable:) Ollila is directly responsible for the most catastrophic leadership choices of Nokia. . . . He chose people who were most adept at flattering him – and appeared blind to how toxic these individuals were to the company’s morale and how incompetent they were in their tasks . . .

* (meets ecpectations:) Up until 2004 his performance was excellent. Ranking among the best in Europe. From 2004 to 2006 I feel that the firm became bloated and lost vision. Which the years from 2006 have of course amplified. However, after leaving the CEO office I feel that the subsequent problems are hard to allocate on Ollila alone. Perhaps he should not have promoted Kallasvuo.

2. Would it have been better for Jorma Ollila to leave Nokia at the 2011 AGM instead of staying for another year?

  • 1. Yes: 43%
  • 2. Maybe: 19%
  • 3. No: 38%

Please, elaborate:
* (yes:) In fact, he should have left Nokia in 2004 when his decisions first steered Nokia on the path of decline. Failing that, he should have left in 2008-09 as soon as it became obvious that Nokia completely underestimated / missed the new trend set by Apple in the industry and was tragically under-equipped to meet the new challenge.

Had he and Kallasvuo left back then, it would not be too late for Nokia to strike an early alliance with Google and rule in Android in the same way Samsung rules today in that space. Instead, complacency of ill-informed top managers with grossly inefficient in-house software led to a slow, certain meltdown of Nokia's clout in the mobile device industry.

* (maybe:) again looking at how Nokia has transformed as a company over the last year it seems to me that it is as if he has gone already. On the positive side thought you did not have everything changing at the same time that could have seen too much to too many people.

* (no:) Yhtiö oli modernin aikakautensa suurimmassa murroksessa ja tällaisessa tilanteessa Ollilan kokemus ja osaaminen on varmasti ollut suureksi avuksi.

* (no:) Nokiassa oli tapahtunut jo erittäin suuri strateginen muutos (Microsoft), joka vaati myös vahvaa johtajuutta. Hallituksen puheenjohtajan vaihtaminen heti sen jälkeen ei olisi ollut järkevää, koska Nokia tarvitsi vielä Ollilaa

* (maybe:) What difference. In 2011 the company was already massively impaired

* (yes:) Mr Ollila had arguably set in place many of Nokia’s current problems several years earlier and should have quietly faded himself into the background.

* (no:) Ollilan johtama hallitus teki helmikuussa 2011 uhkarohkean täyskäännöksen yhtiön älypuhelinstrategiassa, joten on luonnollista että hän seuraa ainakin jonkin aikaa muutoksen etenemistä ja ottaa näin vastuuta tehdyistä päätöksistä.

* (yes:) Difficult to see his contribution after appointment of Stephen Elop. Also, Jorma has decided to stay out of limelight. In any case, he does not have much credibility with regards to Nokia being the architect of its fall himself.

* (no:) He had to try to clear the mess first.

* (no:) I think so many Nokia senior people left after Elop took over, it was good for Elop to have Ollila around as someone he could trust who also understood Nokia

* (no:) With so much change within the senior management ranks at Nokia at the end of 2010 and beginning of 2011, I believe that the decision for Ollila to remain for another year gave some stability to the company.

* (maybe:) Similar answer to question above. Jorma knew Nokia well and was obviously keen to manage the transition from OPK to Elop however he was regarded as part of the “old guard” that caused many of the endemic problems that led to the company’s problems.

* (yes:) as soon as possible – he has demonstrated his inability to deal with Nokia’s recent challenges.

* (no:) The Elop hire had to be made and I can see the advantage of some stability at board level for Elop’s first year. I don’t see how Ollila leaving in 2011 would have helped.

* (no:) Now that the situation is what it is, Elop probably needs support. Ollila's best choice would have been to leave 2006 when he resigned as a CEO.

3. Would it have been better for Nokia if Jorma Ollila had served only as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Nokia - and not also as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Royal Dutch Shell?

  • 1. Yes: 15%
  • 2. Maybe: 65%
  • 3. No: 19%

Please, elaborate:
* (No:) It would only be better if he had served as Chairman of the board of Shell only, and have resigned from Nokia when it was still time to identify the issues, change key managers that were steering in the wrong direction, promote and appoint people that correctly discerned the new industry direction... By staying, he was a promoter of the status quo.

* (no:) not sure how this would have changed things

* (maybe:) what difference would have this made?

* (no:) Compared to others companies / and or other chairmans of the board of directors it is common that managers serve for two or even more companies as a chairman at the same time. Therefore i won't say that his role was a problem for Nokia.

* (maybe:) Many of Nokia’s current problems trace their roots back almost a decade, so having one chairmanship may not have made too much difference as it was too little too late.

* (maybe:) Nämä tehtävät eivät varsinaisesti ole ristiriidassa keskenään, mutta ajankäytöllisesti olisi ehkä ollut Nokian kannalta parempi että hän olisi keskittynyt pelkästään Nokian asioihin.

* (maybe:) We just will never know this one. Most likely it did not play a role here, rather demonstrated that Jorma was himself as arrogant and ignorant as the company he had created. “I can do this with my left hand.”

* (maybe:) but probably did not matter. I think his exposure to another major European corporation helped understand Nokia's situation and have perspective. But towards the end, it may have drawn time away from the attention Nokia needed

* (maybe:) I don’t know how Jorma was balancing his time between Shell and Nokia so it is hard to judge.

* (no:) No role at all would have been optimal.

* (maybe:) I can imagine that Ollila trusted Kallasvuo too much and consequently focused more on Shell than on Nokia. However, the problems at Nokia were execution related more than strategy related – into which the Chairman likely struggles to get good insight.

4. What has been Jorma Ollila's best strategic decision as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Nokia?

* The best decision was back in the early 2000- focus on replacement market and keep manufacturing inhouse when everybody else was outsourcing it….

* To end share buy-backs as of 2009.

* Hiring Elop

* Panostaminen kehittyvien maiden markkinoihin hyvin aikaisessa vaiheessa. Ilman tätä panostusta Nokia olisi nyt tässä murrosvaiheessa erittäin suurissa ongelmissa, sillä uskollisimmat Nokian käyttäjät näyttävät löytyvän (Suomen lisäksi) kehittyvistä maista (mm. Intia, Kiina, Afrikan maat).

* Onnistuneen kasvustrategian toteuttaminen kehittyvillä markkinoilla.

* None

* His and others’ decision to have a stronger US focus, because this is where all the current growth is coming from.

* Panostaminen ”Platform” -ajatteluun muita kilpailijoita aikaisemmin. Yhtenäisen laitteisto- & ohjelmisto-alustan soveltaminen mahdollisti tehokkaan komponenttihankinnan ja tuotannon, sekä loi edellytykset laajaan tuotevariointiin jolla pystyttiin vastaamaan eri markkinoiden ja eri asiakassegmenttien tarpeisiin. Tämä strategia toimi monta vuotta erittäin menestyksellisesti, kunnes älypuhelinteknologia alkoi kehittyä valtavin harppauksin (2007->) eikä Symbian enää taipunut kuluttajien vaatimusten mukana.

* Create critical mass around Symbian during 90s when Microsoft was seen as a key rival and could have created a similarly strong position as in PCs. To recruit Stephen Elop to succeed OPK. I honestly believe that Anssi Vanjoki would have been a worse decision as he was also very arrogant and ignorant. Anssi would have proceeded with a very different strategy, though (Meego).

* Emerging markets strategy in the 90’s and until 2007

* The change of CEO for OPK to Elop, a very bold decision to bring in a non-Finnish exec to run the company.

* Recruiting Stephen Elop.

* Hard to say.

* To consider the low end as important as the high and to create robust platforms for these low end devices to drive scale and lower prices

* Probably deciding to attack Motorola in 2005 (Motorola gave up the fight in 2007, and its market share then went from 22% in 2006 to 1% today). As a result 2007 was Nokia's best year since 2000.

5. What has been Jorma Ollila's worst strategic decision as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Nokia?

* Not taking in the iPhone into the boardroom, underestimating the change and understand the importance of ecosystems- i.e. remaining with SYMBIAN

* To stay on from 2004 on – to stay on from 2008 on – and to appoint Elop as new CEO.

If I have to choose among the three above – the Elop appointment must be the worst of his decisions.

* Time to action

* Kieltäytyminen operaattorikohtaisesta kustomoinnista, minkä seurauksena Nokia menetti asemansa mm. USA:ssa. Vasta nyt viime vuosina Nokia on pyörtänyt näitä päätöksiä ja suostuu tekemään operaattoreille omia malleja puhelimistaan.

* Älypuhelinmarkkinan muutoksesta myöhästyminen vuonna 2007, eli iPhonen ja Androidin nostaman uhkakuvan vähättely. Tähän liittyy myös myöhästyminen kosketusnäyttöpuhelimissa. Toinen virhe on pahasti epäonnistunut verkkoliiketoiminnan yhteisyritys Siemensin kanssa.

* Nomination of OPK – Acquisition of Navteq, the second worst acquisition in the history of Tech after Skype by Microsoft.

* To Underestimate the pace of change in the smartphone market and to the misjudge the importance of software and apps.

* Difficult to comment on, so would prefer to pass.

* Ylimielinen asennoituminen uusiin kilpailijoihin (Apple, Google) ja tätä seurannut itsepintainen hirttäytyminen vanhentuneeseen Symbian -alustaan.

* As mentioned in Stephen Elop’s burning platform memo, not to listen to the customers that did not give good ratings for Nokia’s high-end products even before the iPhone was introduced and not to force Nokia to come up with a matching competitor for the iPhone (N9 was the first product from Nokia that was able to challenge the iPhone and it was introduced in 2011, four years after the iPhone). Also, Nokia did not take good care of developing Symbian, rather it was let to fall behind other platforms. And finally, even though Nokia knew that it would have to ditch Symbian at some point, it did not have contingency plans for other platforms (e.g. Android, Windows Mobile/Phone) with half-ready products, rather was betting everything on Maemo/Meego. From risk management perspective, this is just mindboggling as it wasn’t a question of resources given the size of Nokia’s R&D budget.

* Several acquisitions and joint ventures

* His failure to recognise the changing dynamics of the market. Nokia failed to react to Apple and the Google’s entrance to the market and put its head in the sand.

* Protecting OPK for far too long

* . . . The inability to demand and accelerate a new mobile OS development in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. Choosing Elop as the new CEO. Accepting the Navteq acquisition. Not realizing the importance of touch-screen technology in 2007-2010. Missing the entire mobile app wave in 2007–2010. It is hard to choose between these.

* To apply strict platforms to the high end portfolio, subsequently restricting the firm’s flexibility and ability to adapt to changing market trends. Nokia subsequently had a turning cycle of super tanker proportions when it came to reacting to iPhone and Android.

* 1) Deciding to split the shares of Symbian between Motorola, Ericsson and other leading suppliers. This followed with a R&D deadlock. Nokia should have taken the lead, just like Apple and Google have done, and IBM before Nokia. You cannot create industry leading technology with "open" platform approach. The opposite works - just look at Apple (1976 to now) or IBM (1960-1985).

2) Inability to recognize what technology made possible in handsets and how consumers would change the way they do things (MP3 1998, digital music 2001, touch screen 2002, packet data 2007; and these technologies had been known many years in advance), and to learn from moves made by competitors (e.g. Apple).

3) Slowing down development. Nothing new came out from Symbian between 2002 and 2004.

4) Appointing OPK as his successor. As a result Nokia's organization has been on a flux.

5) The decision to acquire Navteq (5 billion EUR).

6. On November 8, 2010, Nokia "reaffirmed its commitment to the Symbian platform. Nokia plans to continue to invest its own resources in developing Symbian, the world's most widely used smartphone platform, and expects to deliver a strong portfolio of Symbian-based smartphones to people around the world." Only three months later (February 11, 2011) Nokia announced its strategic partnership with Microsoft. Should Nokia have ditched Symbian:

  • 1. Earlier: 65%
  • 2. As decided: 20%
  • 3. Later: 10%
  • 4. Not at all: 5%

Please, elaborate:
* (earlier:) Series 60 ran into trouble WAAAY before the iPhone, and historical Symbian partners Motorola, Sony Ericsson, Siemens, Samsung, LG all knew it. Motorola left Symbian in 2003!!! and said it would focus its efforts on Java applications. Nokia should have listened to its partners; instead, they decided to buy out all remaining Symbian partners, make the OS that no one wants open-source...the rest is history

* (earlier:) Nokia should have moved away from Symbian after the n97 flop and should have thrown every effort into Meego that could have actually kept them from going to an external platform all together.

* (as decided:) Ratkaisu ja ajoitus olivat oikeita. Nykyinen toimitusjohtaja Elop vain hoiti asian ilmoittamisen täysin väärin ja omilla puheillaan käytännössä tappoi Symbian-pohjaisten puhelimien mahdollisuudet helmikuussa 2011. Syntyi jo legendaarinen "Elop-ilmiö": haukkumalla oman tuotteensa vanhanaikaiseksi ja huonoksi ("burning platform" -memo) Elop vauhditti Nokian älypuhelimien markkinaosuuden romahduksen ennätysnopeaksi.

* (not at all:) Oli suuri virhe Nokialta kuvitella, ettei kuluttajien suhtautuminen Symbian-puhelimiin muuttuisi strategiamuutoksen jälkeen radikaalisti. Yhtiö olisi voinut valita Microsoftin käyttöjärjestelmän Symbianin rinnalle ilman, että Symbiania olisi julkisesti yhtiön omasta toimesta haukuttu huonoksi sekä julistettu kuolevaksi käyttöjärjestelmäksi. Nokian omien puheiden takia kuluttajat, operaattorit ja yritykset alkoivat nopeasti strategiamuutoksen jälkeen hylkimään Symbiania. Nokian älypuhelinten myynti romahti ja yhtiö joutui antamaan tulosvaroituksen kesällä. Tämä olisi todennäköisesti voitu välttää, jos helmikuun 11. päivänä Symbiania olisi käsitelty vähän pehmeämmin. Symbiania ei siis olisi pitänyt virallisesti tappaa, vaan pitää hengissä vaikkakin vähitellen hiipuvana käyttöjärjestelmänä.

* (earlier:) Symbian was not in a position to compete and was too entangled into its own legacy to evolve. Keeping Symbian was only abut pride and pride killed Nokia

* (earlier:) The industry knew that Symbian was an aging, keypad-centric, single-screen OS as early as 2007. Waiting 4 years until 2011 to replace and upgrade Symbian with a touchscreen-optimized, multi-screen-compatible alternative was a major strategic error.

* (later:) Nokia might have been better off by adopting a multi-platform strategy in the interim in order to protect market share. They could have announced the switch to Windows Phone this year assuming things had developed as planned in order to maximise sales for Symbian and Meego during 2011-2012.

* (earlier:) As ealy as it was clear that competition was coming out with novel technology, such as the iPod (2001). What Nokia should have done was to take 100% control of Symbian, make Symbian a world leading platform, and replace Symbian as it became evident that powerful new technologies are here (iPod 2001).

* (earlier:) Ramp-down should have been started earlier, and it should have been smoother and over a longer period of time

* (later:) (later from the Feb 11 decision, or 2 as decided and announced previously on 8 Nov 2010). The Microsoft platform was known in late 2010/early 2011 to be unsuitable for most Nokia smartphone needs. It does not support normal Nokia functions and is not compatible currently with either Nokia's near future technical development (like NFC, mobile money, top-end cameras, Augmented Reality) and is also not compatible with the mass market low-cost smartphones. Thus Nokia would need Symbian in parallel with its Microsoft and/or MeeGo platform and the Feb 11 announcement was very premature and damaged Nokia severely

* (as decided:) Android would have been a bad choice of platform and Windows Phone arguably wasn’t mature enough. Equally the decision was made with about 3 months after Elop joined and OPK would not have made such a bold decision.

* (as decided:) Hard question to answer. History has shown that Symbian was fundamentally “broken” and was unable to compete with new operating systems like iOS and Android. It had been in decline for many years but the Nokia management were not prepared to accept its shortcomings. The big mistake was showing the graph at the 11th Feb presentation that showed Symbian sales declining to zero. Although this was a statement of fact with no timeline it resulted in Symbian’s premature decline. A more pragmatic approach could have seen Symbian deliver revenues for longer – particularly given the improvements made to the platform with Symbian ^3 and Symbian Belle subsequently.

* (no answer:) Nokia should have devised a strategy to move beyond Symbian around 2005-2006. Its inability to handle touch-screen driven software was clear back then.

* (earlier:) Management must have been aware that Symbian’s basic capabilities could not be improved upon to match iOS or Android. The real failing was to let Maemo do nothing for years while the played with the 7xx tablets. If they could have brought Maemo / MeeGo to market successfully and then down the price curve from 2006+ then the current situation might have been avoided.

7. On February 11, 2011, Nokia said: "Nokia expects 2011 and 2012 to be transition years." Was it a mistake to announce such a long transition period, as the smart phone revolution was just about to accelerate?

  • 1. Yes: 26%
  • 2. No: 74%

Please, elaborate:
* (yes:) Every year is a transition year for every successful company in the ever-changing, brutally fast-moving smartphone world - even for Apple.

Of course it was time to move on from Symbian, of course it was needed to move to other software platforms, but to brutally announce the accelerated deprecation of legacy products without a ready product at every price point addressed by the legacy platform is a dreadful mistake. Elop made that mistake because he comes from the monopolistic Microsoft, having headed the most monopolistic division of Microsoft Office. Whatever Office throws at business users, business users have to swallow. Microsoft can say today they will discontinue everything but Windows 8 as of 01/01/2013 in order to make sure all businesses buy Windows 8, and all business users can do is sit in a corner and cry. So Elop did the same at Nokia – burning platform memo, announcing MSFT is the only way forward, "legacy support" lip service to Symbian, one and only one Meego (contractual phone in the Intel partnership), period. But sadly, he forgot that Nokia is far from enjoying the monopoly that Microsoft enjoys with Office. Instead, he should have worked on all available platforms from Day One he was appointed, then simultaneously release (without preannouncing) an Android, Symbian (perhaps even MeeGo) and Windows Phone variety of the same product (like the N8 or the N9), and leave carriers and consumers to decide what they wanted from Nokia.

* (no:) It is not like if they did not announce it people would have not realised it was gonna take them over a year to turn things around

* (no:) symbian sales lower wp up = it takes time to go through

* (no:) Ilmaisu oli varsin totuudenmukainen ja kukaan olisi tuskin uskonut johtoa, jos se olisi ilmoittanut muutoksen tapahtuvan nopeammin.

* (ei mielipidettä:) Tätä nopeammin muutosta ei olisi mitenkään mahdollista toteuttaa. Kyse ei ole siitä, onko siirtymäkausi liian pitkä (koska siihen ei voida vaikuttaa), vaan siitä, oliko siirtymä ylipäätään järkevä.

* (no:) No because, it was the right decision to give a fair guidance and to give the capitals markets a clar roadmap concerning the short term strategy. As we can see the transition at Nokia needs that time, and maybe even H1 2013 could be another quarters of transition.

* (no:) Nokia knows it will take 2 to 3 years to turn around such a big ship, so it was best to be open and realistic about that transition period. Nokia had worked itself into such a mess that it had no choice but to announce that multi-year transition period from at least 2011 to 2012.

* (no:) Uuden puhelinlaitteen tie piirustuspöydältä kauppojen hyllyiille kestää tyypillisesti noin 12kk ja koko älypuhelinportfolion uusiminen vie näin ollen helposti tuon mainitun 2 vuotta. Suurin virhe Windows Phone -strategian kommunikoinnissa tehtiin kun yhtiö samaan hengenvetoon hyvin tökeröllä tavalla tyrmäsi koko Symbian -alustan, vaikka sen oli tarkoitus toimia merkittävänä tukena ylimenokauden aikana. Seurauksena oli se, että ulkopuoliset sovelluskehittäjät siirsivät välittömästi pois resurssinsa kuolevan Symbian alustan ympäriltä ja operaattorit leikkasivat merkittävästi Symbian -puhelimille tarjottuja operaattoritukiaisia. Monet sijoittajat katsoivat myös tulleensa harhautetuiksi kun Nokia johto vain muutama kuukausi ennen Windows Phone -strategian julkistusta oli korostanut että Symbian -alustaan tehtyjen merkittävien kehityspanostusten tuloksena oli saatu aikaan ketterä ja kilpailukykyinen alusta, joka mahdollistaisi nopean reagoinnin kuluttajatarpeiden muutoksiin ja joka tarjoaisi kilpailukykyiset työkalut sovelluskehittäjille. Luottamus yhtiön johtoon karisi totaalisesti kun se Windows strategian yhteydessä perusteli Symbianista luopumista täysin päinvastaisella luonnehdinnalla: Symbian ei ole tarpeeksi kilpailukykyinen johtavilla älypuhelinmarkkinoilla ja sillä ei kyetä reagoimaan nopeasti muuttuviin kuluttajavaatimuksiin.

* (yes:) Please, elaborate: Nokia might have been better off by adopting a multi-platform strategy in the interim in order to protect market share. They could have announced the switch to Windows Phone this year assuming things had developed as planned in order to maximise sales for Symbian and Meego during 2011-2012.

* (no:) In that situation, the outlook was pretty realistic

* (yes:) because the handset average replacement cycle is under 18 months and for smartphones even faster than that. the transition period would allow severe erosion of Nokia's loyal customer base

* (no:) These kinds of statements do not matter, everyone understands the situation the company is in anyway.

* (no:) Nokia didn’t have a choice, any platform transition takes a long time. If Nokia had tried to keep things quite a leak would have occurred from an operator partner, Microsoft or disgruntled employee.

* (no:) This was a realistic timeline and Nokia has out-performed my expectations. Getting four Windows Phone devices to market in just over a year is nothing short of a miracle. This would never have happened with Symbian and shows how quickly Nokia is changing. Sales success will take longer and is not yet certain but without this strategic shift Nokia would be in an even worse position.

* (no:) No – handling the transition announcement is the least of Nokia’s problems.

* (yes:) To announce the death of Symbian and MeeGo so early was a mistake in our view. It just brought forward the decline of both platforms.

8. How good a chance do Nokia have to reach again the number one position in smart phone markets?

  • 1. Very good: 0%
  • 2. Good: 20%
  • 3. Moderate: 35%
  • 4. No chance: 45%

Please, elaborate:
* (no chance:) Windows offers no competitive advantage over iOS and Android. Instead, the Windows and Microsoft brand names are a liability with consumers that are now much more open to non-Microsoft software solutions (and actually in many cases prefer non-Microsoft). Ask yourself, how likely are you to buy a Microsoft car, an Apple car or a Google car?

Coming so late into the game, always promising the moon with the next release (Microsof is already underplaying Windows Phone 7.5 and promises miracles with Windows Phone 8) without delivering either a dramatically lower price point (already made impossible as Chinese manfuacturers adopt Android in droves) or a dramatically improved user experience / user interface (good luck when neither Apple nor Google are your friends) means a come-back is now impossible.

* (good:)
they have proven they can execute and they have vision now they need to strengthen the ecosystem and make their brand relevant again

* (no chance:) Microsoftin Windows Phone -käyttöjärjestelmällä on mahdollisuuksia nousta maailman suosituimmaksi älypuhelin käyttöjärjestelmäksi, mutta Nokia on vain yksi monista tätä käyttöjärjestelmää käyttävistä puhelinvalmistajista. Jotta Nokia nousisi takaisin ykköspaikalle, pitäisi Windowsin saavuttaa yli 50%:n markkinaosuus älypuhelimissa ja Nokialla pitäisi olla yli puolet Windows-puhelimien sisäisestä markkinaosuudesta ja tämä yhdistelmä vaikuttaa hyvin epätodennäköiseltä.

* (moderate:) Kaikki riippuu Windows Phonen menestyksestä ja siitä, miten Nokia onnistuu kääntämään halpojen peruspuhelinten strategian halpojen älypuhelinten strategiaksi. Windows Phonen kehitys ei näytä nyt kovin lupaavalta. Odotan, että Samsungista nousee Nokiaa huomattavasti suurempi älypuhelinvalmistajana lähivuosina, koska 1) Samsung tukee sekä Windows Phonea että Androdia 2) sillä on hyvä brändi sekä 3) tehokas tuotantokoneisto ja riittävät mittakaavaedut.

* (no chance:) Do the math yourself. Android and Apple have 80% of the market and are still growing much faster than Windows. Nokia is exclusively comitted to Windows. Have you ever seen in the past ecosystems getting to a dominant position then losing share?

* (moderate:) Actually Apples iOs and Googles Android (especially Samsung) are two steps ahead Nokia. The most important task for Nokia and Microsoft ist to establish windows Phone as the third mobile ecosystem. A problem for Nokia could be that it will be very difficult to differentiate enough on the windows phone plattform and also compared to iOS and Android.

* (good:) Nokia already has excellent brand awareness and logistics worldwide; all it needs now is excellent products. With Android showing signs of weakness, there is a window re-opening for Microsoft and Nokia in the next 2 years.

* (no chance:) Apple and Samsung have overtaken Nokia in brand value. Even if Nokia’s products were better going forward, it would be nearly impossible to close the gap.

* (no chance:) The loyalty has been destroyed, more than half of Nokia's existing customer base has already churned and gone to the iPhone, Android and Blackberry platforms and will not be able to be won back on any of Nokia's options. The fight-back is for maintaining 3rd manufacturer status for Nokia overall and for 5th or 6th ecosystem for Microsoft at best.

* (no chance:) Nokia has lost an enormous amount of ground over the last year, in volume and mindshare. It can compete but is unlikely ever to be the number one smart phone vendor again.

* (moderate:) Its going to be very tough for Nokia to recover its former position but I still expect it to be an important player in the future.

* (no chance:) Apple’s lead is too great and Google’s lead is also insurmountable by now.

* (no chance:) To be #1 Windows Phone likely has to take a 50% market share, with Nokia capturing 60% of this. Even this would only give Nokia 30% share and Samsung might be close to that, with Apple not far behind (at least in $ terms). The chances of Windows Phone taking 50% share seems extremely low to us. This is true for volume share and even more applicable for revenue share.

* (no chance:) 1) There are two issues: a) a software leadership, and b) unit shipments leadership. Without software leadership unit leadership is worthless, because you will end up competing head-to-head with low cost Asian manufacturers, earning very low margins. The true leadership is software - that is why Apple and Google are in true lead.

2) In order to succeed, Nokia would have to take leadership in software development from Apple and Google. Nokia does not have such resources to compete against Apple and Google, and lacks speed and scope. And if Windows phones become more important for Nokia, its available margin sinks further, and it will be practically impossible to get back from that position.

3) Although Windows is talked about a lot, strategically Nokia is a hardware manufacturer using someone else's software platform, and for this reason will never gain leadership on Windows.

4) Nokia's one remaining hope is the Meltemi Linux platform (which the company does not want to talk about as it has not been announced). There Nokia can still become a software leader.

9. Should Nokia enter the tablet market?

  • 1. Yes: 45%
  • 2. Maybe: 40%
  • 3. No: 15%

Please, elaborate:
* (no:) Not until the smartphone situation is sorted out one way or another. You can't be burdened with the biggest corporate challenge in smartphone history and then throw some more challenges on yourself, and expect to execute.

* (yes:) no question about it. tablets and smartphones are joint at the hip. consumers need a migration path from smartphones to tablets

* (maybe:) Markkina kasvaa hurjaa vauhtia, mutta toistaiseksi ainoastaan Apple tekee tablettiliiketoiminnalla voittoa (ja sitäkin enemmän!). Kilpailu on jo nyt erittäin kovaa kymmenien valmistajien tultua mukaan tablettikilpaan. Parhailla kilpailijoilla on kahden vuoden etumatka Nokiaan nähden ja esimerkiksi kovimmat pelurit Apple ja Samsung tekevät jo kolmannen sukupolven tabletteja.

* (maybe:) Kuluttajat haluavat todennäköisesti älypuhelimen ja tabletin saman käyttöjärjestelmän alta tulevaisuudessa. Tablet-markkinan hintakilpailu on kuitenkin erittäin raakaa ja viime vuodelta on paljon varoittavia esimerkkejä epäonnistuneista tulokkaista. Markkina on todella haastava, mutta mahdollisuudet houkuttelevia.

* (maybe:) very secondary concern.

* (maybe:) It depends on the strategy and the possibilities to differentiate. Just rebuild an iPad or an Galaxy Tab makes no sense.

* (yes:) Tablets are a high-growth, high-revenue market that complements cellphones. Nokia absolutely must be in the tablet market by 2013.

* (yes:) Product portfolio would otherwise be less complete than those of rivals.

* (yes:) It’s all about ecosystems. We’ll see if it needs to enter the PC market in the end . . .

* (no:) Absolutely not. Tablets are good for PC makers. But tablets are a hideous waste for phone makers. PC makers like Apple, Samsung etc have been able to make money with tablets. Phone makers find no synergies from parts, distribution channel, retail, branding and payment method (handsets are often subsidised deeply, tablets not). In every way, Nokia would abandon all of its natural competitive advantages and enter a market where it is the underdog. As long as Nokia's primary business of smartphones is unprofitable, where Nokia has huge competitive advantages, it is enormously destructive to devote any resources to a tablet project

* (maybe:) A tough question, I believe that Nokia will enter the tablet market but the value to it will be limited. It is a very tough market with very low margins. Apple dominates and the other vendors fight over the rest of the market. If it does enter it need to find a way to differentiate and add value to consumers. If, together with Microsoft, it can do this then it would be a good idea to enter.

* (maybe:) If it does it must take a cautious approach. It must first fix its phone business. Tablets are logical extension once the phone business has recovered but in the near-term Apple is so dominant it is a challenging segment for all players.

* (no:) the lead of Apple and Amazon is insurmountable – Amazon will push the low-end tablet pricing to $150 by end of 2012 and it has a vast ecosystem to support it. Apple’s software lead makes its tablet position easy to defend. It will have a massive scale advantage by end of 2012

* (maybe:) Where do smartphones end and tablets start? It’s a grey area and Nokia needs to have something in that space. However, the bigger the tablet the more of a laptop replacement it becomes, the lower the margins, etc. It is hard to see how Nokia can compete in this larger sized segments without significant margin compression.

* (yes:) Nokia should be in all segments where mobile consumers are using the internet. As a hardware manufacturer Nokia needs large volumes. Consumer demand is likely to shift from smart phones to tablets.

10. Is Espoo, Finland the best place for the Nokia headquarters in the long-term?

  • 1. Yes: 71%
  • 2. No: 29%

* (-:) This is/should be irrelevant, I don't really have a view. Espoo is as good a place as any other with its advantages and disadvantages, and with today's means of communication, where you are based is of diminishing relevance. That said, it is troubling that today's smartphone software hotbed is in a tiny radius in California . . .

* (yes:) Nokia ia a FInnish company. with their offices in London and Sunnyvale becoming more important where the HQ are is more symbolic what is important is the people that make Nokia

* (yes + no): USA is better – but values are Nordic

* (no:) Pääkonttorin sijainti saattaa jossain kohtaa muuttua rasitteeksi; esimerkiksi lahjakkaimpia avainhenkilöitä rekrytoitaessa voi olla vaikeaa saada heitä tulemaan Suomeen.

* (yes:) Suomalaiset keksivät älypuhelimen ja Suomessa on edelleen maailmanluokan mobiilialan osaamista, joka ei ole katoamassa mihinkään.

* (+/-): No much worst than most other places. A change of headquarters won’t make that much of a difference.

* (yes:) Actually i can't see important triggers why the headquarter should move.

* (yes:) As long as Nokia can deliver world-class devices and services for all regions worldwide, then it should not matter where the HQ is located. For example, Samsung is headquartered in South Korea, but it has still been able to conquer the huge United States market (where it is number one).

* (no:) Nokian liiketoiminnan kansainvälisen luonteen kannalta paras pääkonttorin sijainti olisi sellainen, joka houkuttelee huippuosaajia, josta on hyvät kansainväliset liikenneyhteydet sekä sijaitsee samalla aikavyöhykkeellä pääyhteistyökumppaneiden kanssa. Espoo on hyvä, joskin hieman syrjässä – Maailmalta löytyy lukuisia sopivampiakin sijainteja Nokian pääkonttorille.

* (yes:) If Nokia stays with its high volume, hardware oriented strategy (which is the most likely outcome), Finland is as good as any other place.

* (yes:) Nokia is a Finnish company and has succeeded because of Finnish competence.

* (no:) Physical location of HQ is rather irrelevant, but if you need to pick one, perhaps Finland is somewhat distant for a global consumer goods maker.

* (is pretty irrelevant, the handset industry is the most global industry worldwide, and the HQ could just as well be on any continent)

* (yes:) It is not ideal but it would be a surprise for it to change. The time difference between Espoo and Redmond is 10hrs. Nokia should expand its presence and responsibility of its team on the west coast of the US. This is where the software innovation is happening and Nokia needs to ensure that it is better positioned to react to opportunities that occur.

* (yes:) Nokia has an amazing HQ, strong cultural roots and strong heritage. Finnish values are useful when doing business and Nokia should not be ashamed of its past. Of course it will be vital to grow facilities in other parts of the world – in particularly the West Coast of America but Finland should remain the HQ in my opinion.

* (yes:) Nokia should try to rebuild the company as an emerging market leader – Espoo is a fine location for this line of business.

* (no:) The cost of moving would be too high – for employees, Finland and in terms of continuity at Nokia.